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Abstract
This research develops an evolutionary growth theory that captures the intricate time
path of life expectancy in the process of development, shedding new light on the origin of the
remarkable rise in life expectancy since the Agricultural Revolution. The theory argues that
social, economic and environmental changes that were associated with the transition from
hunter-gatherer tribes to sedentary agricultural communities and ultimately to urban soci-
eties aﬀected the nature of the environmental hazards confronted by the human population,
triggering an evolutionary process that had a signiﬁcant impact on the time path of human
longevity.
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01 Introduction
This research develops an evolutionary growth theory that captures the intricate time path of
life expectancy in the process of development, shedding new light on the origin of the remarkable
rise in life expectancy since the Agricultural Revolution. The theory argues that social, economic
and environmental changes that were associated with the transition from hunter-gatherer tribes
to sedentary agricultural communities and ultimately to urban societies aﬀected the nature of
the environmental hazards confronted by the human population, triggering an evolutionary pro-
cess that had a signiﬁcant impact on the time path of human longevity. The theory suggests
that the deterioration in the health environment enhanced the genetic potential for longer life
expectancy thereby playing a signiﬁcant role in the dramatic impact of recent improvements in
health infrastructure on the prolongation of human life.
The rise in population density, the domestication of animals, and the increase in work
eﬀort in the course of the Agricultural Revolution increased the exposure and the vulnerability
of humans to environmental hazards such as infectious diseases and parasites, increasing the ex-
trinsic mortality risk and leading to the observed temporary decline in life expectancy during the
Neolithic period, as depicted in Figure 1 and detailed in Table 1.1 The theory suggests, however,
that in light of the implicit aspiration of humans, as well as other species, to maximize the num-
ber of their surviving oﬀspring, the evolutionary optimal allocation of parental resources towards
somatic investment, repairs, and maintenance (e.g., enhanced immune system, DNA repairs,
accurate gene regulation, tumor suppression, and antioxidants) was altered in the face of the
fundamental trade-oﬀ between current and future reproduction. The rise in the extrinsic moral-
ity risk generated an evolutionary advantage to individuals who were genetically pre-disposed
towards higher somatic investment leading to the observed increase in life expectancy in the
post-Neolithic period, as depicted in Figure 1.2
1Most comparisons between hunter-gatherers and farmers (e.g., Cohen (1989)) suggest that, in the same locale,
farmers suﬀered higher rates of infection due to the increase in human settlements in size and permanence, poorer
nutrition due to reduced meat intake and greater interference with mineral absorption by the cereal-based diet.
Consequently, Neolithic farmers were shorter and had a lower life expectancy relative to Mesolithic hunter-gatherers.
Although it is diﬃcult to draw reliable conclusion about relative life expectancy in these periods, because skeletal
samples are often distorted and incomplete, available evidence suggests that prehistoric hunter-gatherers often
fared relatively well in comparison to later populations, particularly with reference to the survival of children. The
Illinois Valley provides life tables for hunter-gatherers which conﬁrm the fact that their life expectancies matched
or exceeded those of later groups. Additional evidence mostly from the Old World, are provided in Table 1, and
a r ed e p i c t e di nF i g u r e1 .
2As argued by Angel (1984), partial recoveries from the major breakdown of human health during the transition
from hunting to farming, occurred during the Bronze Age.
1The proposed theory suggests, therefore, that the increase in the extrinsic morality risk
(i.e., risk associated with environmental factors) in the course of the Agricultural Revolution
triggered an evolutionary process that gradually altered the distribution of genes in the human
population that are associated with the intrinsic mortality risk (i.e., physiological and biochem-
istry decay over lifetime). Individuals that were characterized by a higher genetic predisposition
towards somatic investment, repairs, and maintenance gained the evolutionary advantage during
this transition, and their representation in the population increased over time.3 Despite the in-
crease in the extrinsic mortality risk that brought about a temporary decline in life expectancy,
longevity eventually increased beyond the peak that existed in the hunter-gatherer society, due
to the changes in the distribution of genes in the human population. Moreover, the biological
upper bound of longevity gradually increased, generating the biological infrastructure that con-
tributed signiﬁcantly to the impact of recent improvements in medical technology on the dramatic












Figure 1: The Non-Monotonic Evolution of Life Expectancy (at birth) in the course of the
Agricultural Revolution
The evolutionary process that was triggered by the transition to sedentary agriculture was
reinforced by the gradual rise in the extrinsic mortality risk that accompanied the process of de-
3For the eﬀect of somatic maintenance system on longevity see Kirkwood (1998).
2velopment since the Agricultural Revolution, prior to the improvements in health infrastructure.
The gradual increase in population size and thereby population density, stemming from the eﬀects
of division of labor, trade, and technological progress in a Malthusian environment, generated
an additional increase in the extrinsic mortality risk, further elevating the evolutionarily optimal
level of resources that were devoted to somatic investment, repairs, and maintenance. Eventually,
this enhancement in the evolutionary process further increased the survival probability and the
biological upper bound of longevity, contributing to the prolongation of life expectancy.4
The process of urbanization and the associated rise in the concentration of the population
further contributed to the increase in the extrinsic mortality risk. It brought about a temporary
decline in life expectancy along with a reinforcement of the existing evolutionary pressure, en-
hancing the trend of rising life expectancy.5 During the initial process of European urbanization
in which the percentage of the urban population increased six-fold from about 3% in 1520 to
nearly 18% in 1750 [de Vries (1984) and Bairoch (1988)], the rapid increase in population density
generated a rise in mortality rates and a decline in life expectancy.6 As depicted in Figure 2, life
expectancy at birth fell from about 40 at the end of the 16th century to about 33 in the beginning
of the 17th century while mortality rates increased by nearly 50% (Wrigley and Schoﬁeld, 1981).
However, the theory asserts that the evolutionary process, that increased the representation of
individuals who were genetically pre-disposed towards higher somatic investment, was enhanced
by this additional rise in the extrinsic mortality risk, contributing to the observed rise in life
expectancy in the 18th and the ﬁrst half of the 19th centuries. A decline in mortality along
with a rise in life expectancy began in the beginning of the 17th century and life expectancy at
birth rose from about 33 to above 40 in England until the middle of the 19th century, prior to
signiﬁcant advancements in medical technologies. [Livi-Bacci (1997)].7
4The eventual trend of increasing life expectancy was accompanied by regional ﬂuctuations, reﬂecting local
environmental and climatic conditions. For instance, life expectancy ﬂuctuated in the Malthusian epoch, ranging
from 24 in Egypt in the time period 33 - 258 AD, to 42 in England in the end 16th century.
5Major epidemics such as the Black Death in Europe in the middle of the 14th century, further contributed to
the increase in the extrinsic mortality risk (e.g., McNeil (1998)) bringing about an initial decline in life expectancy,
and potentially enhancing the evolutionary process associated with the trend of increased life expectancy.
6Consistently with the hypothesis that the rise in mortality rate was associated with increased urbanization
Clark and Hamilton (2003) ﬁnd that in England during the early part of the 17th century, the average number
of surviving oﬀspring was nearly 50% higher among rural families in comparison to urban families, controlling for
literacy. Furthermore, it should be noted that the evolutionary pressure in the urban environment was probably
severe due to high infant mortality rates. For instance, in the early 19th century infant mortality rate in London
was in access of 400 per 1000 (Laxton and Williams, 1989), whereas infant mortality in the population as a whole
was 104 per 1000 in the ﬁrst half of the 18th century and 49 per 1000 in time interval 1825-1837. (Wrigley and
Schoﬁeld, 1981).















































Figure 2: The Non-Monotonic Time Path of Mortality Rates and Life Ex-
pectancy (at birth) in the Course of Early Urbanization: England 1540-1870.
(Source: Wrigley and Schoﬁeld (1981))
The theory predicts that the interaction between the rise in the extrinsic mortality risk
and the evolutionary process manifests itself in the observed non-monotonic time path of life
expectancy, provided that the rise in the mortality risk is suﬃciently rapid. In the short run
— while the composition of the population remains nearly stationary — the rise in the mortality
risk reduces life expectancy. However, the evolutionary process triggered by the environmental
change and enhanced by the endogenous process of increased population density gives rise to
an advantage for individuals characterized by higher life expectancy and higher biological upper
bound of longevity, increasing their representation in the population. As the composition of the
population shifts suﬃciently in favor of individuals with higher life expectancy , the population’s
life expectancy increases and ultimately it might be higher than the level that existed prior to the
increase in the mortality risk. Moreover, the rise in the extrinsic mortality risk increases the gap
of the 19th century.
4between the biological upper bound of longevity and life expectancy, generating the biological
infrastructure for a dramatic eﬀect of rapid improvements in health infrastructure and medical
technology (and the associated reduction in the extrinsic mortality risk), on the prolongation of
life expectancy.
Consistent with the proposed theory, evidence suggest that changes in the environment
may generate rapid evolutionary processes in the composition of existing genetic traits. In par-
ticular, the time period between the Agricultural Revolution and the Industrial Revolution that
lasted about 10,000 years is suﬃcient for signiﬁcant evolutionary changes in the human popu-
lation. There are numerous examples of rapid evolutionary changes among various species that
were triggered by signiﬁcant changes in the environment.8 In particular, evidence establishes that
the change in the environment during the Agricultural Revolution generated rapid evolutionary
changes in the human population. For instance, lactose tolerance was developed among European
and Near Easterners since the domestication of dairy animals in the course of the Agricultural
Revolution, whereas in regions that were exposed to dairy animals in later stages a larger pro-
portion of the adult population suﬀers from lactose intolerance. Furthermore, genetic immunity
to malaria provided by the sickle cell trait is prevalent among descendents of Africans whose
engagement in agriculture improved the breeding ground for mosquitoes and thereby raised the
incidence of malaria, whereas this trait is absent among descendents of nearby populations that
have not made the transition to agriculture.9
The theory explores the evolution of the distribution of life-history proﬁles (i.e., the life
cycle of somatic investment and its eﬀect on life expectancy)10 in light of the fundamental trade-
oﬀ that exist in nature between investments in somatic maintenance (and thus longevity and
future reproduction) and the resources available for current reproduction. Evidence shows that
the evolved capacity of somatic cells to carry out eﬀective maintenance and repairs (e.g., DNA
8The color change that peppered moths underwent during the 19th century is a classic example of evolution
in nature [See Kettlewell 1973]. Before the Industrial Revolution light-colored English peppered moths blended
with the lichen-covered bark of trees. By the end of the 19th century a black variant of the moth, ﬁrst recorded in
1848, became far more prevalent than the lighter varieties in areas in which industrial carbon removed the lichen
and changed the background color. Hence, a signiﬁcant evolutionary change occurred within a time period that
correspond to only hundreds of generations. Moreover, evidence from Daphne Major in the Galapagos suggests
that signiﬁcant evolutionary changes in the distribution of traits among Darwin’s Finches occurred within few
generations due to a major drought [Grant and Grant 1989]. Other evidence, including the dramatic changes in
the color patterns of guppies within 15 generations due to changes in the population of predators, are surveyed by
Endler [1986].
9See Livingston [1958], Weisenfeld [1967] and Durham [1982].
10See Stearns (1992).
5repairs, accurate gene regulation, tumor suppression, and antioxidants), governs the time taken
for damage to accumulate thereby regulating longevity.11 Experiments and observation in non-
human species indicate that this trade-oﬀ exists.12 Moreover, using a historical data set from the
British aristocracy, Westendorp and Kirkwood (1998) argue that human life histories involve a
trade-oﬀ between longevity and reproduction.
The theory focuses on the evolutionary process with respect to the trade-oﬀ between
parental somatic investment in each oﬀspring and the number of oﬀspring that can be sup-
ported.13 Resources that are channeled towards higher somatic investment in each oﬀspring
generate higher life expectancy, but limit the number of oﬀspring that can be raised. “Increased
bearing is bound to be paid for by less eﬃcient caring” [Dawkins 1989, p. 116]. Thus, there is
an evolutionary trade-oﬀ, regarding reproduction success, between the life expectancy of each
oﬀspring and the number of oﬀspring that can be supported.14 Similar insights would be ob-
tained if one would have alternatively focused on the evolutionary process with respect to the
trade-oﬀ between the resources allocated to current parental own somatic investments (and thus
life expectancy and future reproduction success) and the resources invested in current parental
reproduction.
The probability that an individual would survive to a reproduction age, is aﬀected pos-
itively by the genetically pre-determined somatic investment, and negatively by the extrinsic
11Evidence at the molecular and cellular levels suggest that longevity is correlated with eﬀort devoted to repair
and cellular maintenance. A positive correlation is found among captive mammals between longevity and DNA
repair capacity, genomic integrity, and mitochodrial ROS production. Furthermore, cell resistance to external stress
is larger among long-lived species. Moreover, it should be noted that long-run adaptations that reduce extrinsic
mortality (e.g., larger brains) are generally linked to increased longevity. [Kirkwood (1998)]. These long-run
adaptations, however, are not the focus of the current study.
12See the survey of this evidence by Williams and Day (2003).
13As is well established in the evolutionary biology literature since the seminal work of Lack [1954], the allocation
of resources between oﬀspring ‘caring’ and ‘bearing’ is subjected to evolutionary changes. Lack (1954) suggests
that clutch sizes (e.g., number of eggs per nest), among owls and other predatory vole-eating birds, for instance,
are positively related to food abundance. He argues that the clutch size is selected such that under any feeding
conditions fertility rates ensure the maximal reproductive success. Furthermore, Cody [1966] documents the
existence of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between clutch sizes of the same bird species on islands and nearby mainland
localities of the same latitude. In temperate regions where food is more abundant in the mainland than on islands,
the average clutch size is smaller on the islands. For instance, Cyanoramphus novaezelandeae, the average mainland
clutch is 6.5 whereas the average in the island is 4.
14Consistent with the existence of this trade-oﬀ, recent molecular and behavioral genetic research across historical
and modern data from the United States and Europe suggests that fertility behavior has a signiﬁcant hereditary
component [Rodgers et al. 2001a]. For instance, as established recently by Kohler et al. [1999] and Rodgers
et al. [2001b] based on the comparison of fertility rates among identical and fraternal twins born in Denmark
during the periods 1870-1910 and 1953-1964, slightly more than one-quarter of the variance in completed fertility
is attributable to genetic inﬂuence. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Rodgers and Doughty [2000] based
on kinship data from the United States.
6mortality risk that is associated with socio-environmental characteristics, such as population
density. Variations in somatic investment may manifest themselves in genetically pre-determined
variations in the length of childhood and therefore in the amount of parental resources that are
devoted to each oﬀspring.
The rise in mortality risk triggers a process of natural selection that alters the distribution
of types within the population. Nature selects the life-history proﬁle and thereby life expectancy
that maximizes reproduction success in any given environment, and the distribution of these
hereditary life-history traits evolves over time due to changes in the environment. As long as the
adverse eﬀect of population density on the survival probability is lower for individuals who are
genetically pre-disposed for higher somatic investment, the evolutionary optimal level of somatic
investment is an increasing function of the extrinsic mortality risk. Thus, the evolutionary process
within the human population may lead to a reduction in mortality rates and an increase in life
expectancy, despite the increase in extrinsic mortality risk.
The theory proposes that individuals who are characterized by low somatic investment and
thus low life expectancy have an evolutionary advantage in an environment that is characterized
by low population density, whereas those characterized by high somatic investment and thus
high life expectancy have an evolutionary advantage in an environment that is characterized by
a high population density. Hence, as population density increased in the process of development,
increasing the extrinsic mortality risk, the evolutionary advantage shifted from individuals with
low somatic investment and thus low life expectancy to those with high somatic investment
and high life expectancy. Furthermore, the increase in population density and its interaction
with the forces of natural selection induce a non-monotonic time path of life expectancy. As
population density increased and the extrinsic mortality risk raised, life expectancy declined as
long as the distribution of types in the population has not evolved considerably. Ultimately,
however, individuals with higher life expectancy dominate the population and life expectancy
raised. Moreover, the biological upper bound of longevity increased, generating the biological
infrastructure for the recent prolongation of life expectancy that was brought about by the decline
in the extrinsic mortality risk due to improvements in medical technology.
72 Related Literature
Evolutionary biologists suggest two complementary theories for the evolution of senesces (i.e.,
persistent decline in the somatic function of an organism with age) and thus of life expectancy
based on the premise that selection weakens with age.15 The mutation accumulation theory of
aging [Medawar, 1946] suggests that late-acting deleterious mutations have a smaller negative
eﬀect on the survival of the genes and aging therefore is an inevitable outcome of the declining
force of natural selection in older age. The antagonistic pleiotropy theory [Williams, 1957] suggests
that late-activating deleterious genes may be favored by natural selection and may be actively
accumulated in population if they have a beneﬁcial reproductive eﬀects in early stages of life.
In particular, the disposable soma theory [Kirkwood and Holliday, 1979] examines the optimal
allocation of metabolic resources between reproduction and maintenance.
The proposed theory advances the disposable soma theory, exploring the implications of the
process of economic development on the evolution of the distribution of life-history proﬁles (i.e.,
the life cycle of somatic investment and maintenance) within the human species. The proposed
theory demonstrates that if the eﬀect of a rise in the extrinsic mortality risk on the survival
probability can be mitigated by an increase in somatic investment, then it would necessarily
generate an increase in the (evolutionary optimal) level of somatic investment and may thereby
prolong longevity. Most of the literature in evolutionary biology focused on the eﬀect of a rise in
the extrinsic mortality rate that cannot be mitigated by an increase somatic investment, arguing
therefore that in this type of environment an increase in the extrinsic mortality rate would
generate a decline in somatic investment and thereby a decline in life expectancy. Recently,
however, in light of a wide range of compelling evidence, it has been recognized that the adverse
eﬀect of a rise in extrinsic mortality risk can be counteracted by an increase in somatic investment
[Williams and Day (2003)].
The implications of the interaction between the process of economic development and hu-
man evolution have been explored in recent years.16 Galor and Moav (2002) suggest that during
the epoch of Malthusian stagnation traits of higher valuation for oﬀspring quality generated an
15An earlier theory that is widely considered among biologists as inconsistent with the evidence is the theory of
programmed death (Weismann, 1882). It suggests that aging is beneﬁcial and even necessary at the species level
in order to free resources for the younger generation.
16The evolution of a wide range of attributes such as time preference, risk aversion, and altruism, in a given
economic environment, has been extensively explored in the economic literature, as surveyed by Bowles (1998) and
Robson (2001).
8evolutionary advantage and their representation in the population gradually increased. This se-
lection process and its eﬀect on investment in human capital stimulated technological progress
and ultimately triggered a reinforcing interaction between investment in human capital and tech-
nological progress that brought about the demographic transition and the state of sustained
economic growth.17 Ofek (2001) and Saint Paul (2003) examine the eﬀect of the emergence of
markets on the evolution of heterogeneity in the human population. Clark and Hamilton (2003)
analyze the relationship between the evolution of time preference and the process of develop-
ment, Lagerlof (2004) examines the evolution of human body size in the process of development,
and Borghans, Borghans and ter-Weel (2004) analyze the eﬀect of human cooperation on the
evolution of Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC).18
Abstracting from the process of economic development, Robson and Kaplan (2003) examine
the evolutionary optimal human brain size and life expectancy in the context of hunter-gatherer
societies that were prevalent during the two million years that preceded the Agricultural Revo-
lution. They argue that a decrease in the extrinsic mortality risk that was faced by the human
population led to an increase in somatic investment leading to larger brain size and higher life
expectancy. In contrast to the basic premise of Robson and Kaplan (2003) that the extrinsic
mortality risk decreased in the course of human existence, evidence about the rise of population
density and the lack of signiﬁcant improvements in technology prior to the Mesolithic period,
suggests in fact that extrinsic mortality risk increased in this era. For instance, the transition
from the Paleolithic period to the Mesolithic hunter-gatherer economies corresponded to the
disappearance of large game animals and the consequent adoption of broad spectrum foraging
patterns aimed at a wider array of small animals, seeds, and aquatic foods resulting in a decline
in nutrition and thus human health [Cohen (1989), and Acsa’di and Nemeskeri (1970, p. 169)].
Our theory, in contrast, argues that an increase in the extrinsic mortality risk leads in fact to
higher somatic investment, that mitigates the negative eﬀect of the external environment, lead-
ing eventually to a higher life expectancy. The theory thereby is consistent with the observed
17The theory is applicable for either social or genetic intergenerational transmission of traits. A cultural transmis-
sion is likely to be more rapid and may govern some of the observed diﬀerences in fertility rates across regions. The
interaction between cultural and genetic evolution is explored by Boyd and Richardson (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza
and Feldman (1981), and a cultural transmission of preferences is examined by Bisin and Verdier (2000).
18The Darwinian methodology has been employed in the study of human behavior within the sociobiology
literature (e.g., Wilson [1975]) and in a sequence of studies about the evolution of preferences surveyed by Bowles
[1998] and Robson [2001], within the economics literature. The focus of these models is fundamentally diﬀerent.
They are primarily designed to explain the determination of preference (e.g., Becker [1976], and Hansson and
Stuart [1990]).
9increased in life expectancy since the origin of the human species, although, unlike Robosn and
Kaplan (2002) it is based on the premise that the extrinsic mortality risk increase over this pe-
riod. Moreover, the theory oﬀers an explanation for the observed non-monotonic evolution of life
expectancy in the context of the Agricultural Revolution as well as in the urbanization process,
despite an apparent increase in the extrinsic mortality risk during these periods of increased
population density.
Finally, in contrast to our evolutionary approach to the understanding of the non-monotonic
time-path of life expectancy in the last 10,000 year, existing economic theories have focused on
the contribution of the advancement of health infrastructure, medical technology and education
to the rise in life expectancy in recent centuries, as documented by Fogel (1994) and Mokyr
(1998). Various theories examined formally mechanisms that capture the interaction between
human capital formation, the decline in mortality rate, and the rise in life expectancy, in the
process of development. Erlich and Lui (1991), Galor and Weil (1999), Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder
and Weil (2000), Boucekkine, de la Croix and Licandro (2003), Cervellati and Sunde (2003),
Lagerlof (2003), Hazan and Zoabi (2004), Soares (2003), Weisdorf (2004), and Iyigun (2005)
focus on the plausible role of the reinforcing interaction between life expectancy and human
capital formation in the transition from stagnation to growth.
3 The Basic Structure of the Model
Consider an overlapping generations economy in which economic activity is extended over inﬁnite
discrete time. The economy consists of a variety of individuals that are distinguished genetically
by the resources that they allocate to somatic investment, repair and maintenance, and thereby
by their life expectancy. Resources that are channeled towards higher somatic investment of
each oﬀspring generate higher life expectancy, but limit the number of oﬀspring that can be
raised. Thus, there is an evolutionary trade-oﬀ, regarding reproduction success, between the life
expectancy of each oﬀspring and the number of oﬀspring that can be supported.
The economy is characterized by a Malthusian environment in which the eﬀect of techno-
logical progress on the growth of income per capita is constrained by the increase in the size of
the population, whereas population size is constrained by the availability of resources as well as
by the technological level.
The increase in the size of the population that is facilitated by technological progress
10generates two adverse eﬀect on future population growth. It reduces future income per capita
and thus lowers fertility (the “preventative check”) and it increases population density, raising
mortality rates (the “positive check”). However, this rise in mortality risk triggers a process
of natural selection that alters the distribution of types within the population. Nature selects
the life-history proﬁle (i.e., the life cycle of somatic investment) and thereby life expectancy
that maximizes reproduction success, in any given environment and the distribution of these
hereditary life-history traits evolves over time due to changes in the environment that are induced
by increases in population density. Thus, the evolutionary process within the human population
may lead to a reduction in mortality rates and an increase in life expectancy, despite the increase
in extrinsic mortality risk that is associated with the rise in population density.
3.1 Individuals
In each period a new generation of individuals is born. Reproduction is a-sexual and each in-
dividual is therefore born to a single parent.19 Individuals are ex-ante identical in all respects
except for the genetic variation in somatic investment and the associated life expectancy. Indi-
viduals may live for either one period (childhood) or two periods (childhood and adulthood), i.e.,
children are subjected to a mortality risk that may prevent them from reaching adulthood. In
their childhood, individuals consume part of their parental income. Those who survive and reach
adulthood, work and allocate their income to consumption and child rearing.
3.1.1 Somatic Investment, Extrinsic Mortality, and Life Expectancy
The survival probability of individuals depends upon their somatic investment and the extrinsic
mortality risk that characterizes the environment in which they live. Individuals are distinguished
by the resources that they allocate to somatic investment, repair, and maintenance, and thereby
by their life expectancy. Individuals that are characterized by a higher, genetically predeter-
mined, somatic investment generate higher life expectancy. Variations in somatic investment
may manifest themselves in genetically pre-determined variations in the length of childhood and
therefore in the amount of parental resources that are devoted to each oﬀspring. For simplicity,
it is assumed that the somatic investment of individual of type i during childhood is µi.20 This
19The modeling of sexual reproduction would cluter the analysis, but would not alter the basic hypothesis.
20Clearly, the level of somatic investment of a given type may reﬂect a rigid component that is unaﬀected by the
environment, as well as a ﬂexible one that may react to the existing environment and individual choice. Although
the model abstracts from the existence of ﬂexible components, as would become apparent the qualitative analysis
11genetic trait is transmitted from parent to oﬀspring of type i with probability ρ → 1.
The survival probability of each type of individual depends upon the extrinsic mortality
risk that is associated with the environment and the individual’s genetically pre-determined
somatic investment. The extrinsic mortality risk, xt, is positively aﬀected by population density,
as reﬂected by the population size, Lt, and negatively by a variable, S, that capture the level of
health infrastructure, as well as environmental, social, and technological attributes,21
xt = x(Lt;S). (1)






=0 if Lt ≤ ¯ L(S)
> 0 if Lt > ¯ L(S),
(2)
and limLt→∞ x(Lt;S)=1 .
The probability that individual of type i of generation t would survive to adulthood, Pi
t,
is aﬀected positively by the genetically pre-determined somatic investment in childhood, µi, and
negatively by an index, xt ∈ [0,1], that captures the extrinsic mortality risk;
Pi
t = P(µi,x t). (3)
Thus, the life expectancy of individual of type i of generation t, Ei
t =1+Pi
t, is aﬀected
positively by the genetically pre-determined somatic investment in childhood, µi, and negatively
by the extrinsic mortality risk, xt;
Ei
t = E(P(µi,x t)). (4)
The biological upper bound on life expectancy for individual of type i, Ei
max, is reached when
the extrinsic mortality risk is equal to zero, i.e.,
Ei
max = E(P(µi,0)). (5)
would not be aﬀected if a ﬂexible component would be integrated into the analysis.
21Variations in socioeconomic organizations (e.g., hunter-gatherers, agricultural society, urban society) may alter
the relationship between population size and “eﬀective” population density. In particular, the transitions from a
hunter gatherer society to an agricultural one and from a rural society to an urban one increase the eﬀective
population density (for a given population size) and thus the extrinsic mortality risk
12Individuals whose genetically determined somatic investment is below a threshold ¯ µ(xt)
would not survive and their type would become extinct. That is,
Pi




> 0 if µi > ¯ µ(xt)
=0 if µi ≤ ¯ µ(xt),
(6)
where for all xt ∈ [0,1], ¯ µ(xt) > 0. Moreover, for µi > ¯ µ(xt),P µ(µi,x t) > 0,P µµ(µi,x t) < 0,
Px(µi,x t) ≤ 0a n d
(a) the threshold level of somatic investment below which individuals do not survive, ¯ µ(xt),
increases with the harshness of the environment, i.e.,
¯ µ0(xt) > 0; (A1)
(b) the adverse eﬀect of population density on the survival probability is (weakly) lower for indi-
viduals who are genetically pre-disposed for higher somatic investment and somatic investment
increases the probability of survival in decreasing rates, i.e.,
Pxµ(µi,x t) ≥ 0f o r µi > ¯ µ(xt); (A2)
(c) the elasticity, ηPµ,µi, of the eﬀect of somatic investment on the survival probability, Pµ(µi,x t),
with respect to somatic investment, µi, is smaller than one in absolute value (i.e. an increase
in somatic investment, µi generates less than a proportional decrease in the eﬀect of somatic
investment on the survival probability, Pµ(µi,x t)).22
ηPµ,µi ≡
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Pµµ(µi,x t)µi
Pµ(µi,x t)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1f o r µi > ¯ µ(xt). (A3)
3.1.2 Fertility Across Types
Consistent with the Darwinian theory, preferences (of each adult individual) are deﬁned over their
own consumption and the expected number of their oﬀspring who would reach the reproduction
age.23 Preferences are identical across types and generations. The preferences of each individual
of type i of the adult generation in period t are represented by the utility function
ui
t =( 1− β)lnci
t + β lnPi
tni
t; β ∈ (0,1), (7)
22That is, for µ
i > ¯ µ(Lt), the survival probability P(µ
i,L t) is only “moderately” strictly concave function of µ
i.
23Consistent with the Darwinian theory, therefore, individuals are implicitly assumed to be risk neutral with
respect to the number of oﬀspring (See Robson (2002)).
13where ci
t is the consumption of individual of type i o ft h ea d u l tg e n e r a t i o nt and Pini
t is the
expected number of the individual’s surviving oﬀspring.24
These preferences capture the most fundamental trade-oﬀs that exist in nature. Namely,
the trade-oﬀ between resources allocated to the parent and to the oﬀspring,25 and the trade-oﬀ
between the number of oﬀspring and resources allocated to assure the survival of each oﬀspring.
Individuals of all types who are born in period t − 1 and survive to the second period
of life, generate an income of yt. Consistent with the determinants of income in a Malthusian
environment (Malthus (1798)) that is characterized by scarcity of land, individuals’ income, yt,
is aﬀected positively by the technological level, At, and negatively by the size of the working age
population, Lt. In particular, income per worker is26
yt =( At/Lt)α ≡ y(At,L t). (8)
Given their preference, individuals’ income, yt, is allocated between consumption and child
rearing. In particular, members of type i of the adult generation t divide their income, yt,
between consumption, ci
t, and the cost associated with raising ni
t children of type i, µini
t,w h e r e
µi is the somatic investment of an individual of type i during childhood. The budget constraint
of individuals of type i in the second period of life is therefore27
µini
t + ci
t ≤ yt. (9)
Members of type i of the adult generation t choose the number of their children and their
own consumption, so as to maximize their utility function subject to the budget constraint.
24Although parental preferences are deﬁned over the number of surviving oﬀspring they cannot aﬀect the survival
probability of each oﬀspring (i.e., the level of somatic investment in each oﬀspring reﬂects fundamental biological
needs that cannot be altered by parental choice.) The introduction of an additional component of somatic invest-
ment that reﬂects parental choice would not alter the qualitative analysis, as long as the oﬀspring genetic make-up
plays a signiﬁcant role in the determination of the survival probability.
25Resources allocated to parental consumption may be viewed as a force that raises parental productivity and
resistance to adverse shocks (e.g., famine and disease), generating a positive eﬀect on the ﬁtness of the parent and
the survival of the lineage. This positive eﬀect, however, is counterbalanced by the implied reduction in resources
allocated to the oﬀspring, generating a negative eﬀect on the survival of the lineage. For simplicity, the parent is
not subjected to a subsistence consumption constraint.




α, where T is a stock of (free) land that is normalized to 1.
27If some non-surviving children will parish in the beginning of the childhood period, rather than in the end, as
it is currently assumed, no qualitative change will occur. The cost of those non-surviving children will be zero, and
therefore, n
i
t will stand for the number of surviving children that completed their childhood period. Furthermore,
the incorporation of time as well as real resources as inputs in the production of oﬀspring would not aﬀect the
analysis qualitatively, as shown in the next footnote.
14Hence, the number of children of individual of type i in period t is
ni
t = βyt/µi. (10)
Thus, consistent with the fundamental feature of the Malthusian environment - the environment
that is at the center of the theory - the number of children is an increasing function of parental
income.28 In addition, the number of children is lower among types that require a larger somatic
investment.
3.2 Evolutionary Optimal Life Expectancy in a Stationary Environment
This section examines the individual type that has an evolutionary advantage (i.e., the largest
number of surviving oﬀs p r i n g )i nag i v e ne n v i r o n m e n t ,xt. This type will dominate the population
in the long run, provided that the environment will remain stationary.
Let, µ∗
t, be the genetically determined level of somatic investment that, given the individual




t,x t) be the evolutionary optimal level of life expectancy. It follows that
µ∗
t =a r g m a x P(µi,x t)ni
t
s.t. ni
t = βyt/µi (11)
Lemma 1 The genetically determined level of somatic investment, µ∗
t, that generates the largest
number of surviving oﬀspring, is a unique single-valued function of the environment, xt :
µ∗
t = µ∗(xt) > ¯ µ(xt),
and the evolutionary optimal level of life expectancy, E∗
t , is therefore
E∗
t = E(P(µ∗(xt),x t))
Proof. Since Pi
t = P(µi,x t)=0f o rµi ≤ ¯ µ(xt), it follows that µ∗(xt) > ¯ µ(xt). Further, as
follows from the ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization problem (11), for µ∗(xt) > ¯ µ(xt),
F(µ∗
t,x t) ≡ Pµ(µ∗
t,x t)µ∗
t − P(µ∗
t,x t)=0 . (12)
28See for instance, Boyer (1989) and Clark and Hamilton (2003). The positive eﬀect of the parental income on the
number of children, regardless of the level of income, reﬂects the assumption that child rearing is associated with a
real cost, without any time cost. If a time cost would be added, it would generate the Malthusian structure in low
levels of income but fertility rates will be bounded in a higher level of income. In particular, let τ
i b et h et i m ec o s t
associated with an oﬀspring of parent of type i. Individual i











i). Hence, as in the formulation without a time cost, the
number of children is an increasing function of income and a decreasing function of somatic investment. However,






t 6=0 , the lemma follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem and the deﬁnition of life expectancy. ¤
As follows from (12), the evolutionary optimal level of somatic investment, µ∗(xt), depicted
in Figure 3, is given by the unique tangency point between the function P(µi,x t)a n dar a yf r o m
the origin.
Proposition 1 As depicted in Figure 3,
• Under A1 and A2, the evolutionary optimal level of somatic investment is an increasing
function of the extrinsic mortality risk, i.e.,
µ∗0(xt) > 0.
• Under A1-A3, the evolutionary optimal level of life expectancy is an increasing function of




• Under A1-A2, the evolutionary optimal biological upper bound of life expectancy is an in-





The evolutionary optimal level of somatic investment is an increasing function of the ex-
trinsic mortality risk since the threshold level of somatic investment that permits survival is an
increasing function of the extrinsic mortality risk (Figure 3). As long as the adverse eﬀect of pop-
ulation density on the survival probability is (weakly) lower for individuals who are genetically












i ∈ (xt,x t +1 )
1f o r µ
i >x t +1









∗0(xt) > 0a n ddP(µ
∗(xt),x t)/dxt > 0.
16minimal somatic investment, ¯ µ(xt), that is associated with a transition to a harsher environment,
implies that the evolutionary optimal investment in each oﬀspring is larger (i.e., the tangency
between the function P(µi,x t) and a ray from the origin in Figure 3, would necessarily occur at
ah i g h e rl e v e lo fµ).30
The evolutionary optimal level of life expectancy is an increasing function of the extrinsic
mortality risk if an increase in somatic investment, µi generates less than a proportional decrease
in the eﬀect of somatic investment on the survival probability, Pµ(µi,x t)( i . e . ,i f( A 3 )i ss a t i s ﬁed).31
The evolutionary optimal biological upper bound of life expectancy is an increasing function
of the extrinsic mortality risk since the evolutionary optimal level of level of somatic investment is
an increasing function of the extrinsic mortality risk and higher somatic investment has a positive
eﬀect on the survival probability.
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Figure 3: Evolutionary optimal levels of somatic investment and survival probability for diﬀerent
levels of extrinsic mortality risk, where x0
t >x t
It follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 that an increase in the extrinsic mortality risk
will induce a process of natural selection that will gradually increase somatic investment, life
expectancy and the biological upper bound of life expectancy. Once this evolutionary process
will complete its course, a rapid improvement in the health infrastructure that would decrease
30For instance, if in contrast to (A2), the extrinsic component of the survival rate is independent of somatic
investment, i.e., the survival probability to adulthood P(µ,x)=p(µ)(1−x), then Pµx = −pµ < 0a n dt h eo p t i m a l
somatic investment is negatively aﬀected by the extrinsic mortality risk.
31I ts h o u l db en o t e dt h a t( A 3 )i sas u ﬃcient but not a necessary condition, as is apparent from the example in
footnote 29.
17the extrinsic mortality risk will generate an additional signiﬁcant improvement in life expectancy
(prior to the reversal in the evolutionary process).
Thus, the gradual rise in population density in the process of development since the agricul-
tural revolution, increased the extrinsic mortality risk that was faced by the human population
and therefore triggered a gradual increase in life expectancy. Moreover, the biological upper
bound of longevity increased, generating the biological infrastructure for the recent prolongation
of life expectancy that was brought about by the decline in the extrinsic mortality risk due to
improvements in medical technology.
4 The Dynamics of Population, Technology and Life Expectancy
This section examines the interaction between population growth, technological change and the
evolution of life expectancy in a Malthusian economy. It analyzes the eﬀect of the Malthusian
feedback between technological progress and population growth, and the associated increase in
population density and extrinsic mortality, on somatic investment, life expectancy, until the recent
improvements in medical technology that were associate with the escape from the Malthusian
epoch.
4.1 The Evolution in the Distribution of Types
Consider an economy in period 0. Consistent with the observation that population density prior
to the Agricultural Revolution is rather low and has a negligible eﬀect on the spread of infectious
diseases, it is assumed that population density prior to the Agricultural Revolution was below the
threshold ¯ L = ¯ L(S), above which an increase in population increases the extrinsic mortality risk,
and the index of environmental eﬀect on the survival probability is constant at a level x =0 . 32
Hence, as follows from Lemma 1, the economy in period 0 is dominated by an individual whose
somatic investment is µ∗(0).
4.1.1 Somatic Investment and Survival Probability Across Types
Suppose that µ∗(0) is the somatic investment of individual of type b, i..e., µb = µ∗(0). Individuals
of type b, therefore, have the largest number of surviving oﬀspring in every time period (at least)
prior to period 0, and they therefore dominate the population in period 0.
32Since the theory focuses at the eﬀect of population density on the surviv a lp r o b a b i l i t ya n dt h u so nt h ee v o l u -
tionary process, the vector S is assumed to remain stationary from period 0.
18As follows from the properties of (3), the probability that an individual of type b of gener-
ation t will survive to adulthood, Pb
t , is a decreasing function of the population size, Lt, beyond
a threshold ¯ L, i.e.,
Pb
t = P(µb,x(Lt;S)) ≡ Pb(Lt). (13)
where, as follows from the properties of (3) and (1),
Pb0(Lt)
½
=0 f o r L<¯ L
< 0f o rL>¯ L,
(14)
and it is further assumed that for θ ∈ (0,1)
P(µb,1) < θ and P(µb,0) ∈ (θ,1). (A4)
Hence, since limLt→∞ x(Lt;S)=1 , it follows that
lim
L→∞
Pb(L) < θ and ,P b(L) ∈ (θ,1) ∀L ≤ ¯ L. (15)
Individuals of type b give birth to children of type b with a probability ρ → 1. However,
with an inﬁnitesimal probability (1−ρ) they give birth to children of a diﬀerent type — type a.T h e
population, therefore, remains heterogeneous in any time period and its distribution is aﬀected
by evolutionary pressure.33 Type a is characterized by a higher level of somatic investment,
µa >µ b, that is optimal in some level of a harsher environment x0 ∈ (0,1].34 Hence, as follows
from Proposition 1, the life expectancy of individual of type a in the environment, x0 is higher
than the life expectancy of individuals of type b in the environment x =0 . In particular, to
simplify the exposition, the level of somatic investment of individuals of type a is assumed to
be optimal in the harshest environment, x =1 , and the probability that an individual of type a
of generation t will survive to adulthood in this environment, P(µ∗(1),1), is normalized to 1.35
Hence,
33The existence of a large number of types would not aﬀect the qualitative
analysis about the evolution of life expectancy in the process of development. The presence of two types of
individuals simpliﬁes the exposition considerably and permits the analysis of the eﬀect of a single distribution-
parameter on the evolution of this dynamical system. The generalization for continuum of types is feasible since
as established in Proposition 1, the evolutionary optimal level of life expectancy increases monotonically with the
harshness of the environment, xt.
34As will become apparent, population density would increase in a Malthusian environment, and as established
in Proposition 1, an individual type with higher somatic investment would gain an evolutionary advantage. Thus,
without loss of generality it is assumed that oﬀspring’s deviations from parental type b are only towards higher
somatic investment.
35The normalization of survival probability of individual of type a to 1, prevents an explicit analysis of the eﬀects
of a change in extrinsic mortality risk on the biological upper bound of longevity of type a. However, Since the
focus of this section is on the evolution of life expectancy within the Malthusian epoch, abstracting from the eﬀect
of recent improvement in medical technology on life expectancy this assumption is nota no b s t a c l e .T h ep r e v i o u s





4.1.2 Fertility and Evolutionary Advantage Across types








µa ≡ θ ∈ (0,1). (17)
Since the number of individuals of type i grows at a gross rate of Pi
tni
t, the gross growth









Lemma 2 Under A4, there exists a unique population size, ˆ L>¯ L, such that the fraction of
individuals of each type remains stationary, i.e.,
γt =1 if and only if Lt = ˆ L
where Pb(ˆ L)=θ.
Proof. Follows directly from (13),(??),(17), and (18), noting, A4. ¤
Proposition 2 Under A4,
• Individuals of type b, that are characterized by low somatic investment and thus low life
expectancy, have an evolutionary advantage in an environment that is characterized by low
population density, i.e.,
γt > 1 if and only if Lt < ˆ L
• Individuals of type a, that are characterized by high somatic investment and thus high life
expectancy, have an evolutionary advantage in an environment that is characterized by a
high population density, i.e.,
γt < 1 if and only if Lt > ˆ L
Proof. The proposition is a corollary of Lemma 2, noting A4. ¤
20Proposition 3 If population density increases in the process of development, increasing the ex-
trinsic mortality risk, then, provided that L0 < ¯ L and ultimately Lt > ˆ L, under A4,
• The evolutionary advantage shifts from individuals of type b, with low somatic investment
and thus low life expectancy, to individuals of type a, with high somatic investment and high
life expectancy.
• Life expectancy evolves non-monotonically as population density increases:
i. It is constant as long as population density is below the threshold ¯ L (i.e., life expectancy
of the dominating type in the population, type b, is unaﬀected by the increase in population
since population density is insigniﬁcant)
ii. It declines once population density is above the threshold ¯ L (i.e., life expectancy of the
dominating type in the population, type b, declines due to the increase in extrinsic mortality
risk)
iii. It increases once population density is suﬃciently above ˆ L and it surpasses the historical peak
in life expectancy (i.e. individuals with a high life expectancy, type a, have the evolutionary
advantage and as they dominate the population life expectancy rises)
Proof. The proposition is a corollary of Proposition 2, noting A4. ¤
Once population density is above ˆ L, life expectancy is aﬀected by two opposing forces. On
the one hand, the fraction of individuals of type a — the high life expectancy type — increases
monotonically. On the other hand, however, the increase in population density increases the
extrinsic mortality risk and thus decreases the life expectancy of the population, for any given
distribution of types. Hence, since in the limit the population is dominated by the high life
expectancy type, eventually the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and life expectancy increases. This analysis
is consistent with the insights derived in Proposition 1 for the case of a continuum of types.
4.1.3 Population Dynamics Across Types
In period 0, the adult population consists of two types of individuals: La
0 identical adult indi-
viduals of type a and Lb
0 identical adult individuals of type b, where La
0 + Lb
0 = L0 < ¯ L.S i n c e
individuals of type b are characterized by the evolutionary optimal level of somatic investment
at least until period 0, and since ρ → 1, they dominate the population and Lb
0 → L0.
21In period 0, individuals of type a, despite being characterized by higher life expectancy
do not have the evolutionary advantage. Given the environment, the cost associated with the
maintenance of higher life expectancy is not beneﬁcial from an evolutionary viewpoint, i.e., higher
life expectancy leads to a lower reproduction rate.
The population dynamics of individuals of type i are determined by their fertility rates,
ni
t, their survival probability Pi
t, and the rate of transmission of the genetic type from parents
to oﬀspring, ρ. The distribution of types in the population, therefore, is governed by the forces
of natural selection, giving an evolutionary advantage (i.e., higher expected number of surviving
oﬀspring) to the type that ﬁts the economic environment.

















t+1 = Lt+1. (20)
Let λt be the fraction of individuals of type a in the adult population in period t, i.e.,
λt ≡ La
t/Lt. (21)
It follows from (17) and (19) that
λt+1 =
λtθρ+( 1− λt)(1 − ρ)
[(1 − λt)ρ + λtθ(1 − ρ)]Pb(Lt)+λtθρ+( 1− λt)(1 − ρ)
. (22)






≡ φ(λt,L t). (23)
Lemma 3 (The Properties of φ(λt,L t)). Under A4, as depicted in Figure 4,
φ(0,L t)=0 ; φ(1,L t)=1 for any Lt > 0
φλ(λt,L t) > 0; φL(λt,L t) > 0 for any Lt > 0 and λt ∈ [0,1],
and there exists ˆ L>0 such that Pb(ˆ L)=θ and
φ(λt, ˆ L)=λt;
φλλ(λt,L t) S 0 if and only if Lt T ˆ L.
Proof. The Lemma follows directly from (23) noting A4. ¤
224.2 The Dynamics of Population Size
The evolution of the population size, as follows from (19), and (20), noting that ρ → 1, is
lim
ρ→1













t[λtθ +( 1− λt)Pb(Lt)], (25)





t [λtθ +( 1− λt)Pb(Lt)]/µb ≡ ψ(λt,L t;At). (26)
In order to simplify the exposition and to assure the uniqueness of a steady-state level of
population size and the monotonic convergence to this level (for a given technological level, At,
and for a given fraction of type a in the population, λt ), it is assumed that the absolute value of
the elasticity of the survival probability, Pb
t , with respect to Lt is smaller than the elasticity of
income with respect to labor, 1 − α.
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Pb0(Lt)Lt
Pb(Lt)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1 − α. (A5)
Lemma 4 (The Properties of ψ(λt,L t;At)). Under A4 and A5,
a. ψL(λt,L t;At) > 0; ψLL(λt,L t;At) < 0;
b. ψA(λt,L t;At) > 0;
c. ψλ(λt,L t;At) R 0 ↔ L R ˆ L.
d. ψ(λt,0;At)=0
e. limL→0 ψL(λt,L t;At)=∞;l i m L→∞ ψL(λt,L t;At)=0 ;
f. limA→0 ψ(λt,L t;At)=0 ; l i m A→∞ ψ(λt,L t;At)=∞
Proof. See Appendix.
234.3 Technological Progress
Technological progress in the Malthusian epoch is commonly viewed (e.g., Boserup (1965), Dia-
mond (1997)) as being driven by population size and population density. A Larger population
fosters technological progress via the increase in the supply of ideas, the demand for ideas, the dif-
fusion of ideas, the division of labor, and trade. Population size and population density, therefore,
have a positive eﬀect on technological progress.36
Suppose that technological progress, gt+1, that takes place from periods t to period t +1





where g(Lt) > 0a n dg0(Lt) > 0 ∀Lt > 0.
The level of technology at time t +1 ,A t+1, is therefore
At+1 =[ 1+gt+1]At =[ 1+g(Lt)]At, (28)
where the technological level at time 0 is historically given at a level A0 > 0.
5 The Dynamical System
The development of the economy is characterized by the trajectory of the size of the population,
the distribution of types within the population, and the level of technology. The dynamic path
of the economy is fully determined by a sequence {λt,L t,A t}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes (23), (26) and (28)
in every period t and describes the time path of the fraction of individuals of type a in the adult
population, λt, the number of adult individuals in the population, Lt, and the level of technology,
At.
5.1 The λλ Locus
The λλ locus, as depicted in Figure 5, is the geometric place of all pairs (λt,L t) such that
limρ→0 λt, is in a steady state. As follows from (23)





− λt =0 }. (29)
36In the modern economy, the scale of the economy may reﬂect a lower investment in the human capital of












(λt+1 − λt) T 0i fLt T ˆ L ∀λt ∈ (0,1),
where LtTˆ L if and only if Pb(Lt)Sθ.
Hence the fraction of individuals of type a in the population, λt, is in a steady state if:
(a) λt =0 , i.e.,, if there are no individuals of type a i nt h ep o p u l a t i o ni np e r i o dt and thus there
will be no individuals of type a in all future periods
(b) λt =1 , i.e., if there are only individuals of type a in the population and thus there will be
only individuals of type a in all future periods.
(c) For any λt, Lt = ˆ L, i.e., none of the two types have an evolutionary advantage and thus there
are no changes in the composition of the population over time.
Furthermore, for any λt ∈ (0,1), if Lt < ˆ L and thus λt is not in a steady state then
limρ→1(λt+1 −λt) < 0 and the fraction of individuals of type a decreases, whereas if Lt > ˆ L then
limρ→1(λt+1 − λt) > 0 and the fraction of individuals of type a increases.
5.2 The LL Locus
The LL locus, as depicted in Figure 5, is the geometric place of all pairs (λt,L t) such that, for a
given At, the population size, Lt, is in a steady state.
LL ≡ {(λt,L t;At):Lt+1 − Lt = ψ(λt,L t;At) − Lt =0 }. (31)
Lemma 5 (The properties of the LL Locus).
Under A4 and A5, along the LL locus
Lt = LLL(λt;At) > 0,





< ˆ L for At < ˆ A
= ˆ L for At = ˆ A









< 0 for At < ˆ A
=0 for At = ˆ A
> 0 for At > ˆ A;
25dLLL(λt;At)/dAt > 0.
Proof. As follows from Lemma 4, there exists a unique steady state level of Lt for any pair
(λt At). Hence, Lt = LLL(λt;At). As follows from (26), there exist a unique At = ˆ A>0s u c h
that LLL(λt;At)=ˆ L (where the independence of ˆ A in λt follows from the fact that Pb(ˆ L)=θ).
Furthermore, the remaining properties follow immediately from simple manipulations of (26),
noting that as follows from the properties (a),(b), and (e) of the function ψ(λt,L t;At) stated in
Lemma 4, at the conditional steady-state level of Lt, ψL(λt,L LL(λt;At);At) < 1. ¤
Corollary 1 For all λt and At,
Lt+1 − Lt T 0 if and only if Lt S LLL(λt;At).
5 . 3 T h eE v o l u t i o no fL i f eE x p e c t a n c ya l o n gt h eP r o c e s so fD e v e l o p m e n t
This section describes the evolution of the composition of types and life expectancy from period
0 to a long-run steady-state equilibrium.
Suppose that in this early stage of development the level of technology is rather low (i.e.,
A0 < ˆ A) and the economy can sustain a small population, Lt < ¯ L<ˆ L. Hence, Pb(Lt) > θ,
and therefore individuals of type b have an evolutionary advantage, and as depicted in Figures
2a and 3a, the fraction of individuals of type a in the population, is nearly zero, i.e., λt → 0.
26Furthermore, since Pb0(Lt)=0f o rLt < ¯ L, life expectancy is nearly constant.
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Figure 4. The evolution of the fraction of individuals of type a in the population for a given level
of population density below (panel (a)) above (panel (b)) the threshold for which type a gains
the evolutionary advantage.
Hence, in early stages of development, the environment is characterized by low popula-
tion density, and individuals that are characterized by low somatic investment and thus low life
expectancy have an evolutionary advantage. They dominate the population and their life ex-
pectancy becomes the life expectancy of the population as a whole. Since extrinsic mortality
over this period remains constant, life expectancy remains constant as well.
As At increases over time, the size of the population increases and the LL locus, depicted in
Figure 4a, shifts upward, but remains below ˆ L as long as At < ˆ A. As the population, Lt, increases
gradually and exceeds ¯ L it generates an increase in mortality rates among type b individuals,
decreasing the downward curvature of φ(λt,L t), depicted in Figure 4a. However, the structure of
λt+1 = φ(λt,L t) remains convex with respect to λt. Thus, λt = 0 is the stable conditional steady
state and the evolutionary advantage remains among individuals of type b.
Hence, as population density increases over time, increasing moderately the extrinsic mor-
tality risk, individuals that are characterized by low somatic investment and thus low life ex-
pectancy still maintain their evolutionary advantage. They continue to dominate the population
and their life expectancy is the life expectancy of the population as a whole. However since
extrinsic mortality increases moderately over this period, life expectancy declines.
27As At continue to increase over time, the size of the population increases and the LL
locus, depicted in Figure 5, continues to shift upward. Ultimately At passes the threshold ˆ A,
triggering a qualitative change in the dynamical system. The level of technology At > ˆ A sustains
a population of a size larger than the population threshold ˆ L, and individuals of type a gain the
evolutionary advantage. The qualitative change in the process of evolution is reﬂected by the
qualitative change in the structure of φ(λt;Lt). As depicted in Figure 4, φ(λt;Lt) turns from a
convex function of λt, in Figure 4a, to a concave function of λt in Figure 4b, implying that the
globally stable fraction of individuals of type a is 1, rather then 0. Hence, as depicted in Figures
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Figure 5. The evolution of the fraction of individuals of type a in the population for a given level
of population density for a given level a technology - above (panel (a)) and below (panel (b)) the
population density threshold above which generates an evolutionary.
Once population density is above ˆ L, life expectancy is aﬀected by two opposing forces.
On the one hand, the fraction of individuals with the high life expectancy, type a, increases
monotonically. On the other hand, however, the increase in population density increases the
extrinsic mortality risk and thus decreases the life expectancy of the population, for any given
distribution of types as long as the fraction of individuals of type b in the population remains
signiﬁcant. Hence, since in the limit the population is dominated by the high life expectancy
type, eventually the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and life expectancy increases.
Hence, as population density increases over time, increasing the extrinsic mortality risk,
28individuals that are characterized by high somatic investment and thus high life expectancy gain
the evolutionary advantage. They gradually dominate the population and in the long run their
life expectancy becomes the life expectancy of the population as a whole. However since the
extrinsic mortality risk increases over this period, life expectancy may further decline prior to a
gradual increase to a long run level that is beyond its peak in early stages of development.
296 Concluding Remarks
This research develops a theory about the evolution of life expectancy in the process of develop-
ment. The theory argues that social, economic and environmental changes that were associated
with the transition from hunter-gatherer tribes to sedentary agricultural communities and ulti-
mately to urban societies aﬀected the nature of the environmental hazards confronted by the
human population, triggering an evolutionary process that had a signiﬁcant impact on the time
path of human longevity. The increase in the extrinsic morality risk (i.e., risk associated with
environment factors) associated with the Agricultural Revolution triggered an evolutionary pro-
cess, further enhanced by the process of urbanization, that gradually altered the distribution of
genes in the human population that are associated with the intrinsic mortality risk (i.e., physi-
ological and biochemistry decay over lifetime). Individuals that were characterized by a higher
genetic pre-disposition towards somatic investment, repairs, and maintenance (e.g., enhanced
immune system, DNA repairs, accurate gene regulation, tumor suppression, and antioxidants)
gained the evolutionary advantage during this transition, and their representation in the pop-
ulation increased over time. Despite the increase in the extrinsic mortality risk that brought
about a temporary decline in life expectancy, longevity eventually increased beyond the peak
that existed in the hunter-gatherer society, due to the changes in the distribution of genes in the
human population. Moreover, the biological upper bound of longevity increased, generating the
biological infrastructure for the recent prolongation of life expectancy that was brought about by
the decline in the extrinsic mortality risk due to improvements in medical technology.
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Proof of Proposition 1:
As follows from (12), the negativity of Px(µ∗,x t)a n dPµµ(µi,x t), and Assumptions A1 and
A2,
µ∗0(xt)=−
Pµx(µ∗,x t)µ∗ − Px(µ∗,x t)
Pµµ(µ∗,x t)µ∗ > 0. (32)









Pµx(µi,x t)µi − Px(µi,x t)
Pµµ(µi,x t)µi + Px(µi,x t).
Hence,
dP(µ∗(xt),xt)
dx > 0 iff Pµi(µi,x t)Pµx(µi,x t)µi >P x(µi,x t)[Pµµ(µi,x t)µi + Pµi(µi,x t)],
and thus
dE(P(µ∗(xt),xt))
dx > 0 if Pµi(µi,x t)/µi >
¯ ¯Pµµ(µi,x t)
¯ ¯ .





P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .
(a) As follows from (26), noting that as follows from A5, (1 − α)Pb(Lt)+Pb0(Lt)Lt > 0,
ψL(λt,L t;At)=( β/µb)Aα
t L−α





t [(1 − α)λtθ +( 1− λt)[(1 − α)Pb(Lt)+Pb0(Lt)Lt]]
+(β/µb)Aα
t L−α
t (1 − λt)[(2 − α)Pb0(Lt)+Pb00(Lt)Lt] < 0
(b) Follows directly from ψ(λt,L t;At).
(c) Follows from ψ(λt,L t;At)n o t i n gt h a tψλ(λt,L t;At)=( β/µb)Aα
t L1−α
t [θ − Pb(Lt)].
31(d) Follows directly from (26).
(e) Since, ψLλ(λt,L t;At)=( β/µb)Aα
t L−α
t [(1−α)[θ−Pb(Lt)]−Pb0(Lt)Lt]] > 0f o rL>ˆ L,i tf o l l o w s
that, for Lt > ˆ L, ψL(1,L t;At) ≥ ψL(λt,L t;At) for all λt, and therefore, since ψL(λt,L t;At) > 0
lim
L→∞
ψL(λt,L t;At) ≤ lim
L→∞
ψL(1,L t;At)=0
(f) Follows directly from the structure of ψ(λt,L t;At). ¤
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Table 1. Life Expectancy: From the Epipalaeolithic Period to the Iron Age
31.67 34.5 44.03 800-700  Mezocsat
Iron Age2
22.81 24.72 28.97 1400-1200  Mezocsat
Bronze Age2






16.25 19.81 24.92 3500-2500 Volni (Ukraine) 
2
16 17 4000-3000 Khirokitia (Cyprus) 
14.7 19.4 22.1 4000-3000 Khirokitia (Cyprus) 
21 4000 Vovnigi (Russia) 
16.9 7000-6000 Catal Huyuk
Neolithic1
24.521 27.783 21.145 Maghreb Type Model 
21.6 25.6 34.45 Sahaba (Nile Valley) 
11.94 14.7 23.57 Hayonim Cave (Israel) 
22.8 39.88 Vassilievka (USSR) 
21.9 Afalou-Bou-Rommel
(Algeria)
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